Even if Erdogan wins, he is going to lose

Even if Erdogan wins, he is going to lose

Recep Tayyip Erdogan is fighting for his life as Turkey prepares for presidential and parliamentary elections on May 14.

 

Even if Erdogan wins, he is going to lose

Three primary factors explain why he is trailing in the polls. Erdogan can no longer rely on his authoritarian bargain, which was based on providing economic development and opportunities for upward mobility in exchange for political allegiance or complicity.

Despite being irreversibly damaged now, this served Erdogan well for the most of his 20 years in office. His monetary policy is obstinate and ignorant, which has left the economy vulnerable and dealing with rising inflation. Over the past few years, there has been a significant decline in buying power, leading to rising poverty and economic inequality. However, Erdogan's bad news is not limited to the economy.

The second, and maybe most significant, factor is that a hitherto weak and fragmented opposition is now united against him. Kemal Kilicdaroglu, the head of the social-democratic Republican People's Party and the nominee of what is known as the Nation Alliance, is supported by an eclectic coalition of six parties, bolstered by the backing of a kingmaker Kurdish political organisation. In the surveys, Kilicdaroglu leads Erdogan, although the difference is small.

Thirdly, the enormous earthquake that hit Turkey on February 6 and left more than 50,000 dead also works against Erdogan. The catastrophe glaringly demonstrated Erdogan's one-man rule's inefficiencies and institutional deterioration. The state was almost nonexistent in the early aftermath of the tragedy, much to the tremendous frustration of millions of those impacted. Governmental agencies failed to handle post-disaster aid activities in addition to search and rescue operations under the corrupt leadership of inept cronies.

These elements ought to result in a significant loss for the governing Justice and Development Party (AKP) under normal conditions. However, Erdogan's Turkey no longer holds free and fair elections. The majority of the media and the legal system are under government control. If the opposition does not win by a wide majority, Erdogan can refuse to accept defeat and challenge the outcome in court or, worse still, in the streets. Kilicdaroglu, 74, is the mastermind behind the opposition's newly found cohesion despite lacking charm and oratory prowess. He has a solid reputation for integrity. He does, however, consistently lose to Erdogan.

Kilicdaroglu's ability to win the first round of a two-round, fiercely contested presidential election with more than 50% of the vote will ultimately depend on an unknowable: Muharrem Ince, whose resurgent campaign has emerged as a populist disruptor to Erdogan's delight. Younger people dissatisfied with both the AKP and the opposition are attracted to Ince, who receives between 5 and 7 percent of the vote.

The stakes have the entire nation on edge. The majority of people are open to change. However, the same social group is concerned and shocked by the idea of Erdogan losing power. Many Turks find it difficult to imagine that Erdogan will peacefully vanish after losing an election, much like many Western observers who lack faith in Turkey's democratic maturity. This takes us to a very significant—yet sometimes misunderstood—aspect of the Turkish drama that is going to play out: Erdogan's greatest asset is his air of political invincibility.

There appears to be a fatalistic attitude that Erdogan will find a way to maintain power and that a smooth transition would be difficult to achieve. The same alarmism views this election as Turkey's final opportunity to avoid a dictatorship before it becomes place. Such concerns might inspire the opposition. However, it is out of place and overlooks reality.

Turkey is not an autocrat like Russia or China, where surveys are only for show, and Erdogan is not as powerful as he makes himself to be. Elections will still be important despite the illiberal character of strongman leadership if the Turkish people are not scared by Erdogan. Even if he succeeds in winning, the Turkish people and the opposition should not lose confidence and trust in elections; rather, they should be alert, make sure the outcome is not manipulated before yielding, and get ready for the next battle. Erdogan won't reign forever, even if it's a pyrrhic success in the near run for Turkish democracy. Even if Erdogan succeeds, he will undoubtedly lose. 

Let's not forget that in 2019 when the opposition was strong and got backing from the Kurds, Erdogan lost municipal elections in all of the main cities. Erdogan resisted the outcome in Istanbul, a 16 million-person megacity and a microcosm of Turkey, where he forced his way to a rematch following a close defeat.  

In a landslip, he lost.

And all of this occurred before the recent economic collapse and hyperinflation. Erdogan is an isolated, detachment-ridden man who lives in a large presidential palace, surrounded by sycophants. Yes, after 20 years in power, he has earned a well-deserved reputation as a Machiavellian survivor. However, the personalisation of power, the hollowing out of governmental institutions, and the concentration of decision-making have not made him more powerful. 

The Turkish strongman, however, is presently most exposed. On May 14, Erdogan's populist proposals, like raising the minimum wage and lowering the retirement age, won't be the main factor in his victory; instead, they'll be a side effect. It will be because a sizable portion of Turks continue to have this opinion.